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Reflections on Edward Said and the
Legal Narratives of Palestine: Israeli
Settlements and Palestinian Self-
Determination
John Strawson*
Cults like post-modernism, discourse analysis, New Historicism,
deconstruction neo-pragmatism transport [scholars] into the
country of the blue, an astonishing sense of weightlessness with
regard to the gravity of history and individual responsibility
fritters away attention to public matters and public discourse.
The result is a kind of floundering about that is most dispiriting
to witness, even as society as a whole drifts without direction or
coherence. Racism, poverty, ecological ravages, disease and an
appallingly widespread ignorance: these are left to the media
and the odd political candidate during an election campaign.
Edward Said'
I. Orientalism and Law in Palestine and Israel
Modern law has been the product of the international
confluence of the European Enlightenment and European
Colonialism. As law took shape in the intellectual framework of
modernity, colonialism became the main mechanism of its circula-
tion and consolidation. Law's inheritance in the postmodern and
postcolonial world is stamped with the signs of this triumphant if
inglorious journey.2 While colonialism has withered, a postcolonial
world has taken shape in which the world replicates elements of the
* School of Law, University of East London: john.strawson@virgin.net
1. EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 366-67 (1993).
2. See PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW (2001).
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old order through which the West assumes a centrality against the
periphery of the ex-colonies. However, this is not necessarily a
geographical phenomenon, as much as a discursive one in which the
media, information technology and the academy become the
mediums of transmission. In this, law is an important site of
imagery and representation which attempts to bestow legitimacy on
the metropolitan center as a center of the legal order. Edward
Said's Orientalism3 offers us a methodology to deconstruct this
discourse, and in this essay, I want to review its application to the
very site which spurred his intellectual quest and which remains his
commitment, Palestine.
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has proved to be one of the
most intractable and inflammatory disputes of our time.' It
stretches back to the nineteenth century and its political and legal
aspects become interwoven with critical historical moments, the
First World War, the Second World War, the Holocaust, the anti-
colonial movement and the Cold War. For more than the past year,
the escalation of violence has not only brought tragedy to both
peoples but also has been woven into the international crisis
created by the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York,
Washington and Pennsylvania. Now for the first time, the conflict
cannot be contained as regional and assumes international
implications. The legal issues of self-determination, human rights
and the law of war lie at the heart of the problem not as passive
legal doctrine, but as I shall argue as contested narratives.
The legal status of Palestine and the legal discourses within
Palestine itself present an array of complexities at almost every
level. In the past century, Palestine experienced the rule of the
Ottomans, British, Jordanians, Egyptians and the Israelis. At the
same time, it has been the site of hybrid legal structures and legal
personalities such as the Jewish Agency under the British Mandate
and the Palestinian Authority since the implementation of the Oslo
3. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIENT
(1978).
4. See Avi SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD (2001);
See also NICHOLAS BETHEL, THE PALESTINIAN TRIANGLE: THE STRUGGLE
BETWEEN THE BRITISH, THE JEWS AND THE ARABS, 1935-1948 (1980).
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Agreements In this m6lange of legal systems and plethora of
colonialisms, the Palestinian narrative has been constituted.
Edward Said's contribution in Orientalism and Imperialism and
Culture has been to develop a methodology of postmodernist
textual deconstructive techniques while retaining a sense of the
"gravity of history." Without undermining the power of texts
themselves and the discursive imagery they produce, Said permits a
degree of intentionality to the author who, if not fully alive in the
conventional sense, is at least contextualized. In this manner, texts
and their authors maneuver not only in the parameters of meaning,
but within a politico-historical field. This interplay between text
and context is built though a subtle, although uncomfortable
amalgamation of Foucault and Gramsci in the early passages of
Orientalism. In his explicitly political works concerning Palestine,
The Politics of Dispossession,6 Peace and It's Discontents and the
End of the Peace Process, Said's rhetorical style advances
committed politics that builds on his theoretical work demon-
strating the clear relationship between texts, representations and
policy choices. In his autobiography, Out of Place,9 he contex-
tualizes his own identity and location which helps his readers plot
an uneasy path between the postmodern and the political. Law is
not Said's central concern, although all his references to law are
pregnant with insight. His apparent passing reference to the legal
work of the eighteenth century Orientalist, Sir William Jones, as
being of "symbolic significance in the history of Orientalism" is
such a moment." Said provides us with a methodology which offers
us a way of interrogating the discourse and connecting it to politico-
5. There are three main texts: Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization
Declaration on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993,
International Legal Materials, Vol. 32 (1993), 1525; Israel-Palestine Liberation
Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strop and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994,
International Legal Materials, Vol. 33 (1993), 622; Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, International Legal
Materials, Vol. 35 (1995), 650. For a commentary, see GEOFFREY R. WATSON,
THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE
AGREEMENTS (2000).
6. EDWARD W. SAID, THE POLITICS OF DISPOSSESSION: THE STRUGGLE FOR
PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION 1969-1994 (1994).
7. EDWARD W. SAID, PEACE AND IT'S DISCONTENTS: GAZA-JERICHO, 1993-
1995 (1995).
8. EDWARD W. SAID, THE END OF THE PEACE PROCESS: OSLO AND AFTER
(2000).
9. EDWARD W. SAID, OUT OF PLACE: A MEMOIR (1999).
10. SAID, supra note 3, at 78. The relevance of Said's work to law has
sometimes been controversial. See ELIZABETH ANN MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 1-17 (1999).
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historical contexts. This essay will focus on the idea of settlement
and self-determination in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Legal
narratives emerge from a variety of sources apart from formal texts
and doctrines; they arise in the popular media, scholarly work and
in the legal justifications for political policies.
II. Discourses of Locations
Locations are complex political issues and this paper's title is
necessarily an ambiguous invention into thought: "Israeli settle-
ment" and "Palestine" are constructed through discourse as well as
space. Each term is contested within a location constructed
through colonial experience, contemporary history and war, which
situate the terms uncertainly within the postcolonial. In each case,
we slip between discursive circulation of representations and the
gravity of events. Each discourse articulates new boundaries and
with them allocates new identities in which depressing and
problematic binary opposites become so mimetic that they are
repressed beneath the rubble of rhetorical excess; liberation/
oppression; return/Diaspora; settlement/expropriation. The
locations of Israeli settlement and Palestine have occupied legal
narratives in a particular way since the British occupied Palestine in
1917, constituting an almost fantastic concentration of colonialism
in its final phase. The specter of sovereignty confronts the struggle
for self-determination for nine decades.
The term "settlement" in Israeli history is a powerful one
coming from the Hebrew "Yishuv" in the phrase "Yishuv Ertez
Yisreal" meaning the settlement of the land of Israel. 2 This
expression became commonly used for the Jewish community in
Palestine from the late nineteenth century. The continued use of
the term for Israeli settlements on the West Bank, Gaza and East
Jerusalem constitutes a significant discursive linkage. It signifies
both a sense of permanence and insecurity at the same time. It is a
brittle term which the Israeli regime appears only recently to have
grasped as it attempts to persuade the world's news media to use
11. For a discussion of the legal issues of Palestine and Israel until 1990, see
JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE (1990). For a
review of these issues since the Oslo Agreements, see RAJA SHEHADEH, FROM
OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
(1998).
12. For a discussion of this a review of a useful summary of the academic
debate, see DEBORAH S. BERNSTEIN, CONSTRUCTING BOUNDARIES: JEWISH AND
ARAB WORKERS IN MANDATORY PALESTINE 3-10 (2000).
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other phrases such as "Jewish Neighborhoods."" Yet Yishuv is so
firmly inscribed into the legal discourse that the term "settlements"
appears in each text of the Oslo Accords." As Geoffrey Aronson
points out, "settlement before and after [1948] was the product of
as-yet unfinished consolidation of Jewish sovereignty in
Palestine."" He continues, "in Israel's view, security, sovereignty
and settlement are inextricably linked. The security achieved by
Israeli settlement according to this calculation is essentially an
existential concept rather than a military imperative.' ' 6 The Israel
government web site places the current settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza within this perspective, claiming legal gloss from
the Mandate of the League of Nations;
Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory has
existed from time immemorial and was expressly recognized as
legitimate in the Mandate for Palestine adopted in 1922 by the
League of Nations, which provided for the establishment of a
Jewish state in the Jewish people's ancient homeland. Indeed,
Article 6 of the Mandate provided as follows:
The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights
and positions of other sections of the population are not
prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable
conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish
Agency... close settlement by Jews of the Land ......
The insecurity expressed in the legal grounds is underlined by
the claim that the Mandate provided for a Jewish state whereas it
provided for a Jewish National Home, a purposely ambiguous term
to avoid the use of the legally recognized concept of state. Indeed
even the Zionist movement"8 appeared to accept this reality. A year
before the Mandate came into effect at the 1921 Zionist Congress
in Carlsbad, the main resolution adopted argued that the aim was
13. There have been many such moves but for the latest, see Robert Fisk,
CNN caves into Israel over its reference to illegal settlements, THE INDEPENDENT,
Sept. 3, 2001, at 9.
14. For the background to these negotiations of the Accords, see URI SAVIR,
THE PROCESS: 1,100 DAYS THAT CHANGED THE MIDDLE EAST (1998).
15. GEOFFREY ARONSON, SETTLEMENTS AND THE ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN
NEGOTIATIONS: AN OVERVIEW 3 (1996).
16. Id.
17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel, The Terror Intifada: The
Current Wave of Palestinian Violence, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/
mfa/go.asp?MFAHOi9oO (last visited Sept. 3, 2001).
18. For an instructive discussion of the Zionism, see AMNON RUBINSTEIN,
FROM HERZL TO RABIN: THE CHANGING IMAGE OF ZIONISM (2000).
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The determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab
people on terms of unity and mutual respect and together with
them make a common home into a flourishing community, the
up-building of which may assure each of its peoples an
undisturbed national development. 9
This proposition appears in stark contrast to the narrative as it is
developed on the web site. It illuminates a more complex history of
Zionism than the essentialist presentation by the current Israeli
government. The resolution is quite startling in advancing the idea
of a "common home" which can accommodate, and indeed
promote, two national projects. This extract of the resolution is
quoted in a letter from the British Colonial Secretary, Winston
Churchill, to the Arab Delegation from Palestine. Churchill,
through his official, Schuckburgh, is attempting to assure the
Palestinians of the limited character of the Jewish national home.
He underlines this by explaining "it is contemplated that the status
of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian,
and it has never been intended that they or any section of them
should possess any other juridical status." 20 In an earlier letter, the
British government is keen to poor scorn on the idea that they call
"exaggerated interpretations" and "unauthorized statements"
about the Balfour Declaration representing its policies. The British
reject the idea of "wholly Jewish Palestine," arguing "phrases have
been used such as that Palestine is to become as 'Jewish as England
is English .... "His Majesty's Government," the letter continues,
"regard any such expressions as impracticable and have no such aim
in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated ... the
disappearance of the Arabic population, language or culture."
Churchill explains that the Balfour Declaration only committed
itself to the creation of a Jewish national home "in Palestine.
21
[Italics in the original]. The British government attempted to
finesse the meanings of the Balfour Declaration so as not to
antagonize the Palestinian Arab population during this
19. Resolution of the Zionist Congress held September 1921 referred to with
Approval by Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill in correspondence with the
Arab Delegation from Palestine in 1922; see ABRAHAM TULIN, BOOK OF
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL HOME FOR THE JEWISH
PEOPLE 29 (1947). It is great significance that the Jewish Agency chose this extract
to be included amongst the 42 documents that they selected to bring to the
attention of the UN and the Special Commission on Palestine at a critical moment
in the campaign for Jewish self-determination in Palestine in the world body.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 28-29.
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correspondence. However, any number of textual interpretations
does not escape the decisive policy implication of the creation of a
Jewish national home. While the 1921 Zionist Congress obliged the
British government, neither the British nor the Zionists quite
understood that constituting a new political entity within a country
of necessity would transform that society.
The text of the Mandate becomes quite critical as it re-cycles
the apparently vague formulations of the Balfour Declaration by
which the Palestinian majority is transformed into a marginal legal
entity. It is this language which affords the Israeli Foreign Ministry
a degree of comfort, especially in the reference to the Palestinian as
merely "other sections of the population." The entire Mandate
never refers to the Palestinians as a people at all, preferring such
phrases as we see above and more widely known "existing non-
Jewish communities. ' The Mandate marginalized the identity of
the Palestinians, enshrining this in law. Whereas the Jewish
population (80,000 in 1922) has a clear identity, the Palestinians
(90% of the population) were merely "non-Jewish" or "other." In
this way, international legal discourse dispossessed a people of their
identity which opened the way for others to dispossess them of their
land. While the named Jews were promised a close settlement of
the land, the unnamed Palestinians were granted the elusive right
that their position would not be prejudiced. The Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs explains what that means in the current situation.
"Many Israeli settlements have been established on sites which
were home to Jewish communities in previous generations, in an
expression of the Jewish people's deep historic and religious
connection with the land." The text continues, "Israeli Settlements
have been established only after an exhaustive investigation process
under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Israel, designed to
ensure that no communities are established on private Arab Land."
It therefore concludes, "settlements themselves are not intended to
displace Arab inhabitants, not in practice do they do so.
23
All this is argued in the context that Israel is not bound by the
Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) as (1) the West Bank was not
under the settled sovereignty of a state when Israel occupied it in
19674 and therefore Israel's presence is not technically an
22. See John Strawson, Mandate Ways: Self-Determination in Palestine and the
"Existing Non-Jewish Communities," in SANFORD R. SILVERBURG, PALESTINE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ed., 2001).
23. The Terror Intifada.
24. See ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Ed. 1978).
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occupation and (2) settlements are not a forced change in the
population balance as Palestinians are not removed and Israelis
move of their own free will. In addition, as the Palestinians have
signed the Oslo Accords and as these stipulate that Israeli
settlements will be discussed in the permanent status talks, the
Palestinians have accepted the "disputed" character of the territory
and, in effect, agreed to the continuing building of settlements, "the
building of homes has no effect on the status of the area." These
tendentious legal arguments aside, the narrative emerges, almost
part messianic, with talk about deep historic and religious
connections with the land and the frankly banal statements about
home building. These are, however, encoded within a legal
narrative that has been inherited in large part from the British
Mandate.
The argument that Israeli settlements are not built on Arab
private land is a reference to the fact that most land in Palestine is
not held as privately owned land (mulk) but as miri or state land.
This category of land was clarified during Ottoman rule with the
Land Code of 1858. As a result, when the Israeli Foreign Ministry
claims that Arab private land is not available for settlement, it is
merely announcing that miri land indeed is.25 The British Mandate
authorities effectively liberalized the process of expropriation of
land and extended the categories in any event. In particular, the
British gave the military power to expropriate all categories of land
for security reasons merely by the issuance of a certificate by the
relevant commanding officer.26  It is under these British
modifications of Ottoman law that the Israeli seize land in the
occupied territories," forcibly removing people from their homes,
destroying agricultural land and thus forcibly expelling populations.
Even in areas formally controlled by the Palestinian Authority,
Israel has used its military incursions during the Al-Aqsa Intifada
to destroy Palestinian homes. Between April and September 2001,
some 227 homes have been bulldozed in Gaza. On August 27th
alone, 23 homes were demolished in Rafah leaving 138 people
without shelter.' As a building can be destroyed so land can be
25. See RAJA SHEHADEH, THE LAW OF THE LAND 11-30 (1993).
26. See FREDERIC M. GOADBY & MOSSES J. DOUKHAN, THE LAND LAW OF
PALESTINE Ch. XIX (1935). The text has been recently reprinted (Holmes Beach:
Gaunt, 1998). The entire book is a master-piece of how colonial regimes occupy
legal systems.
27. See John Strawson, Britain's Shadows: Post-colonialism and Palestine, in
TAREQ Y. ISMAEL (Ed.), THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 203-25 (2000).
28. See Middle East Socialist Network (MESN), at http://www.egroups.com/
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acquired for continuing settlement [incomplete sentence]. The
destruction of homes in Rafah and in places in the West Bank and
Gaza is connected to creating a better security for the settlements.
The current Israeli military action is driven by the existential
impulse to secure the settlements.
Since the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East
Jerusalem in the 1967 war, Israel has built some 170 settlements in
the West Bank with a population of about 200,000, a further 16 in
Gaza with a population of about 7,000 and further 10 settlements in
East Jerusalem with a population of about 180,000. Spatially, the
settlements dominate hills and are located in circles around all
major Palestinian towns. In East Jerusalem, they take the
appearance of Crusader Forts dominating the East of the city and
effectively cutting off the 200,000 Palestinians of East Jerusalem
from the West Bank. Settlement building and their populations
have expanded dramatically in the years since the signing of the
Oslo Accords (in 1993 the West Bank settlement population was
115,000) with the highest rises taking place under Labor led
governments (Rabin-Peres 1992-1996 and Barak 1999-2001). The
settlements dominate the countryside of the West Bank and the big
Palestinian cities like Nablus (population 200,000) where settle-
ments and Israeli military installations can be seen from the city
center. In a pervasive sense, settlement is ever-present through the
major system of Israeli roads, which crisscross the West Bank and
Gaza connecting each Israeli outpost. A virtual Israel is perched
above Palestine which gives the Israelis who use the roads a sense
of being at home while simultaneously condemning the Palestinians
below to a physical and psychological sense of being under
occupation. The central presence of the Israelis and the marginality
of the Palestinians mimic the legal narratives of the Mandate as it is
inscribed in spatial realities or as some Israelis more attuned to
positivistism put it create "facts on the ground." The connection of
the settlements to the settlement of the 1920's and 1930's in the
mind of the Israeli regime legitimize each other. The case for the
creation of the state of Israel was inextricably connected to the
settlement of the land through the pioneers (the halutzim) who
through their physical occupation provided the structure for Jewish
immigration and the creation of a significant population, which
claimed the right to self-determination. This claim was recognized
through the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181
(1947), which partitioned Palestine into two states. Settlement
group/mesn (last visited Sept. 3, 2001).
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precedes sovereignty. The methods which achieved settlement and
sovereignty in the past are thus sanctified and woven into a story of
heroism in which the land is redeemed and that redemption
receives approval. This narrative becomes so fundamental to the
idea of national that its repetition is reaffirmation.
It is, perhaps, due to the relative failure of land settlement
during the Mandate that the current Israeli narrative attempts to
glamorize a past. In 1939, the British government's figures on
Palestine land transfers reveals that 6% of the countryside land was
in the land of Jews and that Jews number some 9% of the rural
population.29 From these statistics, it emerges that 83% of the
Jewish population were urban, thus undermining the myth of the
return to the land despite the provisions of the Mandate and well
placed misgivings of the Palestinian population. The aggressive
reconnection of current settlement activity in the West Bank with
this past is connected to the insecurities of legitimacy, rather than a
confidence born of past success. The legends of redemption of the
land by heroes in past generation is deployed to good effect and the
studied ambiguity of the legal language of the past becomes an able
collaborator in the perpetuation of the myth. The power of the text
palliates the inadequacies of a historical record while it establishes a
legal register of the present. Moreover, it creates a convenient
bridge from British colonialism to Israeli occupation. The
occupation of Palestinian land after 1967 is set alongside the buying
of Palestinian land under the British Mandate. In the Mandate
days, the Jews saw themselves having to fight the British in order to
be able to buy land so that they could establish the national home.
In this the Jews are portrayed as weak immigrants (many refugees
which was quite accurate) struggling against a major imperial
power. Land obtained was "liberated." The transfer of this
representation to occupation serves the purpose of constituting
Palestinians and today's Israeli's as merely replaying the decades-
old land conflict on the basis that the territory is legally disputed.
III. Palestinian Narratives
For Hanan Ashrawi, speaking for the Palestinians, this
situation constitutes an "ongoing Nakba [catastrophe], a most
intricate and pervasive expression of persistent colonialism,
apartheid, racism and victimization." She explains,
29. See ABRAHAM TULIN, Facts and Figures Concerning the Palestine Land
Transfer Regulation, in BOOKS OF DOCUMENTS 19, 197 (Ed. 1939).
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More than half a century ago [53 years], The Palestinians as a
people were slated for national obliteration, cast outside the
course of history, their identity denied, their very human
cultural and historical reality suppressed. We became victims of
the myth of a land without a people for a people without a land
whereby the West sought to assuage its guilt over it horrendous
anti-Semitism and by the total victimization of a whole nation.
Zionism sought to implement its agenda by exclusivity by
usurping not only the lands and rights of the Palestinians. But
also by confiscating their utterance and distorting their historical
narrative. 30
It is significant that it was in the period of the rise of the
consciousness of right of self-determination in the 1950's and 1960's
that saw the nadir of the Palestinian position. It is against this
background that makes Ashrawi's comment about the "confis-
cation" of the Palestinian voice all the more significant. It was
during these two decades that, while the United Nations General
Assembly elaborated the law on self-determination, this confis-
cation took place. The place of Palestinian self-determination in
the contemporary history of international law provides an example
of the difficulties that peoples in the international community face,
as the norms and doctrines of international law are changed around
them. For the Palestinians, the clarifications of international law
neatly intertwine critical moments.' The League of Nations and
the United Nations are specifically involved in establishing the legal
status of Palestine and Israel. In the days of the Mandate,
international law did not provide for the legal right to self-
determination, as it divided peoples into different levels of
"civilization" according to which international legal rights were
awarded to those regarded as most advanced. The typology of
civilization, and the allocation of subsequent legal rights, depended
entirely on a register constructed by the West and led by the
Imperial powers. As Rosalyn Higgins points out, even the United
Nations Charter, despite the aspirations contained in article 1,
provided for an international regime for non-self-governing
territories (under the Trusteeship Council as provided for in
30. Hannan Ashrawi, Address at the Non-Governmental Organizations Panel
at the UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerances, Durban, South Africa (Aug. 28, 2001).
31. See PAUL J.I.N. DE WAART, THE DYNAMICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
PALESTINE: PROTECTION OF PEOPLES AS A HUMAN RIGHT (1994).
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chapters 11 and 12).32 According to Higgins, the legal right of self-
determination emerges in the 1960's.33
The Palestinian narrative remains suspended between the
nakba of the 1940's and of the 1950's and 1960's as the Palestinians,
as a people, are transformed into the category of refugees by the
United Nations. This is compounded by the acquiescence of the
international community that not even the Arab State in Palestine,
as provided by General Assembly resolution 181, will come into
being. This meshes with the international realization of the Shaoh34
and its connection to the creation of the State of Israel. As Said
comments
Unquestionably the moral dilemma faced by anyone trying to
come to terms with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a deep one.
Israeli Jews are not the white settlers of the stripe that colonized
Algeria of South Africa. They are correctly seen as the victims
of a long history of Western, largely Christian, anti-Semitic
persecution that culminated in the scarcely comprehensible
horrors of the Nazi Holocaust. To Palestinians, however, their
own role is that of victims of the victims. This is why Western
liberals who openly espoused the anti-apartheid movement ...
and many other political causes of that kind have shied away
from openly endorsing Palestinian-self-determination.35
The Palestinian narrative is thus trapped several times over in a
legal terrain strewn with human rights abuses and war crimes. The
voice of the Palestinians is caught in a great wind of multiple
injustices, wrought in Europe and by Europe in its colonial projects.
Palestinian calls for justice and for the legal right of self-
determination are set alongside Jewish appeals for justice in which
the Jewish voice has become that of the Israeli state. The
narratives of both peoples are not only entwined but also are sub-
sumed by a grand architecture of political and legal representations,
32- See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND How WE USE IT 111-28 (1994).
33. The key texts being: the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Peoples and Territories United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and the 1970 Declaration on International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 2625 (XXV). Both of these instrument are recognized as sources of
law by the International Court of Justice in the Namibia Case (1971), and the
Western Sahara Case (1975).
34. SHOAH, HEBREW FOR HOLOCAUST; See MARTIN GILBERT, THE
HOLOCAUST: THE JEWISH TRAGEDY (Fontana/Collins, eds., 1986).
35. SAID, supra note 8, at 271.
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the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Israel. It is
not merely that the Palestinian narrative is stolen, but that the
Jewish narrative too becomes politicized to a high degree.
European colonialism has consolidated itself in the discourses of
the modern Middle East in an extremely concentrated form.
IV. Israel and Colonialism
What I called for in Orientalism was a new way of conceiving
the separations and conflicts that had stimulated generations of
hostility, war and imperial control. And indeed one of the most
interesting developments in post-colonial studies was a re-
reading of the canonical cultural works, not to demote or to dish
dirt of them, but to re-investigate some their assumptions, going
beyond the stifling hold on them of some versions of the master-
36slave binary dialectic. Edward Said.
The renewed discussion of the colonial content of Israel's
narrative is an important moment. Colonialism has a different
trajectory in Palestine than in other imperial possessions. The
narratives of occupation are more complex. Herbert Samuel
explains his emerging interest in the future of Palestine during the
First World War. "I soon arrived at a definitive conclusion," he
writes,
that if, as we anticipated the war ended in a victory for the allies,
Palestine ought undoubtedly to be separated from the Turkish
Empire; that the opportunity should be taken to facilitate the
establishment of a great autonomous Jewish community there;
and that it should be under some form of British Protectorate.37
Samuel explains that the idea of a Jewish State was
"impractical, in the conditions that prevailed, five-sixth of the
population of Palestine being Arabs." As a consequence, he
favored "the establishment under British control together with the
fostering of Jewish immigration, and the conferment upon then new
Jewish community in Palestine of the broadest autonomy that
practical conditions would allow., 38 Samuel, who became the first
High Commissioner when the Mandate took effect in 1922, had
according to his own account, been advocating this policy in the
British cabinet eighteen months before the well-known Balfour
36. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 352-53 (1995).
37. HERBERT SAMUEL, GREAT BRITAIN AND PALESTINE 12 (London: The
Second Lucien Woolf Memorial Lectures, 1935).
38. Id. at 15.
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Declaration in November 1917. Indeed, the Declaration itself-
which takes the form of letter to private individual, Lord
Rothschild -essentially communicates Samuel's conclusions.
Colonialism and Zionism have become essentially connected as the
Jewish national movement sees its interests in the extension of the
British Empire to Palestine. Whereas colonialism meant for most
peoples a denial of national identity-and its reconfiguration in
Imperial interests-for Jews colonialism was to be its constituting
agency. Zionism's debt to British colonialism is deeply buried in a
fundamental denial. In this narrative, the British become a colonial
oppressor against a people seeking self-determination, freedom and
sovereignty.39 The end of the Mandate becomes the War of
Independence that occupies a critical place within the national
Israeli myth. '  The British heritage, in the legal context, has
received the attention of Israeli scholars in recent years although so
far there has been a muted reaction.41
The articulation of this narrative is central in the discussion of
settlements as it was a Colonial power that created the protectorate
under which Jewish nationalism is able to flourish. This is not a
straightforward process without its contradictions. The British
Mandatory authorities and the Westminster government had no
consistent policy towards Palestine and became irritated with each
side. The Peel Commission was vicious in its criticisms of the
administration, but in part, this was embedded in the twists and
turns of British policy on Jewish immigration, land sales from
Palestinians and others to Jews and more fundamentally on what
the objective of the Mandate was. Nonetheless, despite the policies
which the Yishuv fought for particularly on immigration, the
context of the Mandate created the framework in which Jewish
political and legal identity developed. It was the Mandate that gave
Jews the first quasi-national political institutions with legal powers
-the Jewish Agency. Indeed, it was this body that was to become
active in international relations too. It was the nucleus of the
Israeli state, developing executive and legislative branches and
importantly overseeing the creation of the haganna (its defense
39. Most eloquently expressed in: MENACHEM BEGIN, THE REVOLT (1979).
40. For a contemporary discussion of various aspects of this period, see 29
ISRAEL L. REV., THE WAR FOR PALESTINE: REWRITING THE HISTORY OF 1948
(Eugene L. Rogan & Avi Shlaim eds., 2001).
41. See Asaf Likhovski, In Our Image: Colonial Discourse and the
Anglicization of the Law in Mandatory Palestine, 29 ISRAEL L. REV. 292-359
(1995); and RONEN SHAMIR, THE COLONIES OF LAW: COLONIALISM, ZIONISM AND
LAW IN EARLY MANDATE PALESTINE (2000).
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force). Colonialism proved an effective tool in constituting
institutions that facilitated the emergence of a national narrative.
Israeli nationalism is born as form of protected nationalism. It is
this relationship to colonialism and its subsequent history of, in
turn, being reliant on Russian, French and American arms-and
U.S. financial subsidies-that produce the impulse of an aggressive
independence.
Jewish nationalism develops in the womb of British
colonialism. From the earliest days of the British occupation,
Weizman, the head of the Zionist Commission strikes up a friendly
relationship with General Allenby. As Tom Segev recounts, this
sensitive friendship meant that Weizman advised Allenby not to be.
seen with him in public in Jerusalem. The problematic
relationship between the fetus and the womb was recognized at an
early stage. The complexities of relations between the British and
the Jewish population extend to family connections. Edwin
Samuel, for example, was the British liaison officer to the Zionist
Commission. His father, Herbert Samuel received regular reports
on the most critical issues years before he became High
Commissioner.43 In this period (1917-1920), the British military
authorities contained a variety of views on Zionism, Arab nation-
alism and Palestine in general. Many in senior positions were wary
of Zionism and indeed of local politics as a whole. It would be
wrong, therefore, to assume that there was some conspiracy
between the British and Jewish nationalism. In reality, the
ambiguity of the situation suited both sides as in Weizman's care in
not walking in Jerusalem with Allenby shows. Roland Storrs, the
Governor of Jerusalem, sums up the British attitude to Arabs and
Jews: "I am not for either of them but for both. Two hours of Arab
grievances drive me into the Synagogue, while after an intense
course in Zionism, I am prepared to embrace Islam.""
The ambiguity between British and Jewish nationalism is
further confounded in the peculiar character of the colonial rule in
the form of the Mandate. According to Norman Bentwich, the
most senior legal figure in the first decade of British rule, "of the
Palestine Mandate it must be said that, if the Mandate system has
not been evolved for other purposes, it would have to had to be
created for the government of this little land." 5 British rule thus
42. TOM SEGEV, ONE PALESTINE COMPLETE: JEWS AND ARABS UNDER THE
BRITISH MANDATE 85 (Haim Watzman trans., 2000).
43. Id. at 90.
44. Id. at 92.
45. NORMAN BENTWICH, THE MANDATE SYSTEM 21 (1930).
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masqueraded under special form of alleged international rule.
Amongst this contradictory framework, Jewish settlement began to
grow. Between 1917 and 1939, the Jewish population rose from
about 80,000 to 390,000. As the settlement grew, so the Jewish
proto-government institutions grew in authority and significance.
The settlement took place within Palestine and amongst the
Palestinians.
A decade before the Balfour Declaration, Yitzhak Epstein
wrote: "Among the grave questions raised by the concept of our
people's renaissance in their own soil, there is one that is more
weighty than all the others put together. This is the question of our
relations with the Arabs. It has not been forgotten, but rather has
remained completely hidden .... "6 It remains hidden within
Israeli discourse as the Palestinians are constructed as somehow out
of place. The Palestinians appear as a detached and moveable
people who do not even live on every centimeter of their own
territory, indicating a lack of affinity with it. "There is no reason,"
writes Benjamin Netanyahu, "why every lonely cluster of Arab
houses should need to claim autonomy over the entire mountain on
which it is perched."47 The Israeli Foreign Ministry echoes this
sentiment in attempting to answer the question, why are there more
Palestinian than Israeli casualties. "It should be stressed that in
order to confront the Israeli soldiers, the Palestinian rioters must
leave their residential areas and go to the outskirts of their towns
and villages."'  Again, according to the Foreign Ministry, the
reason that there have been so many child casualties, is that the
"Palestinian Authority has even taken to providing transport for
children to violent flashpoints."' 9 In the Israeli account, Palestinian
location is constructed as tenuous. The hidden question from a
century before hovers over the Israeli presence.
V. Zionisms, Palestinian Nationalism and Identity
Levinas clearly privileges dichotomy: there would be first of all a
realist Zionism, more political and, perhaps, "inadequate to the
prophetic ideal." Perhaps, more inclined to the current
nationalism, this political Zionism would explain, in pre-
46. Avi SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD 1 (2000).
47. BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, A PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS: ISRAEL AND THE
WORLD 352 (1993).
48. Israeli Foreign Ministry, The Terror Intifada: The Current Wave of
Palestinian Violence, available at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?
MFAHOi900.
49. Id.
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Hitlerian Europe and sometimes still today, a reticence on the
part of certain Jews who align themselves with a "universalist
finality." A second Zionism would be more open to the
eschatological vision of a holy history, or else and indeed
through this-a politics beyond the political-to what Levinas
calls a "political intervention."
Whether or not one endorses any of these analyses of the actual
situation of the state of Israel and its political visibility (and I
must admit that I do not always do so), the concern here is
incontestable: on the other hand, to interpret the Zionist
commitment, the promise, the sworn faith and not the Zionist
fact, as a movement that carries the political and its other; and
on the other hand, to think a peace that would be purely
political.
Jacques Derrida °
In an extraordinary display of unintended optimism, Edward
Said suggested that 2000 would be a year of peace treaties between
Israel and Syria and a permanent arrangement with the
Palestinians.' His argument, however, was that the injustices that
power relations would encode into these treaties would spell
disaster in the medium term. As it happened, 2000 was marked by
the new intifada. After the collapse of the Camp David talks,52 it
became clear that Israel was not even prepared to recognize the
creation of a Palestinian state on the 22% of Mandatory Palestine
that has remained in Arab hands after the 1948 War. The
occupation of 1967 was to remain fixed in certain respects.
At the 2000 Camp David talks, the Israeli offer to the
Palestinians has been described as accommodating 90% of the
Palestinian demands, and therefore, the intifada is but another
illogical outburst of Oriental furry. On the right of Israeli politics,
the intifada is a confirmation that Palestinian and Arab demands
are always unreasonable and threaten the existence of Israel.
While on the left, the intifada is constructed as a grave
disappointment that the Palestinians have not lived up to their
expectations as quiescent partners. In this context, it is instructive
50. JACQUES DERRIDA, ADIEU To EMMANUAL LEVINAs 78-79 (Pascalle-Anne
Brault & Michael Naas trans., 1999).
51. EDWARD W. SAID, THE END OF THE PEACE PROCESS: OSLO AND AFTER
XI-XII (2000).
52. See Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David,
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfalgo.asp?MFAHOhnlO (last visited Nov. 1,
2001).
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to reflect on what the offer of the Israelis was at Camp David and
latter at Sharm el Sheikh and Taba. Under these proposals, the
new Palestinian state would have no borders with any other country
but Israel, as Israel would control the Jordan Valley (adjacent with
Jordan) including the coast and waters of the Dead Sea. It would
retain all of Jerusalem and annex about 9% of the West Bank to
Israel where most of the settlers live. This annexed territory would
cut the West Bank into two and provide Israel with a corridor
linking its military positions in the Jordan Valley at the beginning
of the Dead Sea. Further, swathes of territory would remain Israeli
in the North and South of West Bank. In Gaza, the Israeli wanted
to keep their settlements and set up an Israeli military zone at
Rafah on the boarder with Egypt.53 Far from a viable Palestinian
State, it appears that the Camp David proposals would have
constituted an entity with about 50% of the West Bank and 70% of
Gaza with some special arrangements on Jerusalem. The rest of the
West Bank would have been subject to negotiation over the next
twenty years. Both at Camp David as in other negotiations, the
Israeli's have stipulated that any state must be demilitarized and
that sovereignty over water and the air space must remain with
Israel.
These negations between Israel and the Palestinians have
stalled and the situation was exacerbated with the election of Ariel
Sharon as Prime Minister in February 2001. However, the question
for postcolonial discourse must be how do we assess these
negotiations in the first place? What is that we are seeing in these
events? The point that Hanan Ashwari so eloquently made about
the colonial character of the occupation is central. The colonialism
of the present places these negotiations into a high problematic
context. As a consequence, it appears that the law was drafted not
to provide a basis for a just resolution of a dispute, but to become a
mechanism for securing and legitimizing the fruits of conquest. The
law was drafted to provide a doctrinal blessing. In the frisson of the
present, the Oslo Accords reappear as colonial instruments through
53. These proposals are not secret although Bill Clinton and the Israeli's did
not provide any maps during the negotiations, from the summer of 2000 to January
2001. The Palestinians did, however, produce a map on the basis of the Israeli
"offer." For this map, see Phil Reeves, Arab Nations Add Their Voices to the
Chorus of Despair, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 5, 2001, at 14.
54. See Robert Malley, New York Review of Books, Aug. 9, 2001, available at
http://www.nybooks.comlarticles/14380 (last visited Feb. 19, 2002). Robert Malley
was President Clinton's Special Assistant for Arab-Israeli Affairs and participated
in the talks.
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which the occupied agree to certain terms of the occupation.55 The
instruments stand against those of former centuries all over the
colonized world in the Americas, Australasia and Africa. Through
the Oslo instruments, the Palestinian leadership agreed to leave five
issues for future negotiations, including Israeli settlements. In
addition, and quite critically through the means of the Interim
Agreement, they agreed to the division of the West Bank into three
areas, in which one, Area A, the Palestinians would have exclusive
control. As a percentage of the West Bank, this began as 3% in
1995, but by 2000 had become 20% constituted of scattered areas
around the six major population centers. While the Palestinians
control the civil administration of a further 20% of the West Bank,
the Israeli military still circulate freely in 80% of the West Bank
and 30% of Gaza. As Said points out, the Palestinians were lured
into agreeing to a new basis for the occupation, and one in which
they would play their part in its administration. In his account, the
PLO leadership receives official titles (Ministers, commanding
officers, governors) but these have about the same status as local
rulers in colonies of old. The colonial practice of obtaining the
involvement of the colonized in own government and law can be
seen in the way in which the Oslo process works. When the
colonized work within the boundaries set by the occupying power
for participation in government they are seen as abiding by good
governance, but any resistance to such limitations is seen as
backsliding. Thus, the Palestinian Authority's refusal to arrest
activists at Israel's bidding is referred to as a breach of the
agreements and the occasion for the campaign of Israeli
assassination of these people.
A circle of colonialisms forms the context for the narrations of
Israeli settlements. The connections between the Zionist project of
the late nineteenth century, British foreign policy, the Mandate, the
role of the United Nations in 1947 and today's Israeli settlements in
the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem are intimately woven into
Palestinian and Israeli political and legal discourses. The
declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 proves to be a declaration
of intent to create Israel rather than the recognition of an act
achieved. Despite the fact that between May 14, 1948 and June 6,
1967 no Israeli government even argued that Israel had any claims
to the land occupied by Jordan and Egypt-not even East
55. See EDWARD W. SAID, PEACE AND ITS DISCONTENTS: GAZA AND JERICHO
1993-1995 1-18 (1995).
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Jerusalem6-as soon as the occupation took place, Jerusalem was
"unified" and the rest of the territory was treated as "liberated."
The Six-Day war, it appears, unleashed both political and religious
irredentism that surpassed normal political considerations and lead
directly to the continuing Nakba that Ashrawi talks about.
However, the continuing Nakba, in Ashrawi's account,
continues "by confiscating their utterance and distorting their
historical narrative." The idea of the confiscation of the Palestinian
narrative is complex as the process of confiscation comes from
multiple sources. The political and legal discourses of intertwined
lineages-colonial, Zionist, the Shoah, Arab nation-alism, the
United Nations-all impinge on this process. The weight of the
events of the Nabka in 1948 did appear to wipe the Palestinians
from the map, as British Mandate Palestine came under the control
of Israel, Jordan and Egypt. However, as Rashid Khalidi argues,
Even amidst the appalling conditions that affected the
Palestinians, and the fragmentation that had beset them
following the losses of their homes, the first stirrings of a
reconstitution of an independent Palestinian identity were
already taking place. In the refugee camps, the schools and the
universities where Palestinians congregated in the years after
1948, we find the beginnings of a pre-history, as it were, of a new
generation of Palestinian national groups and movements which
started clandestinely in the 1950's and emerged into the open in
the mid-1960's.57
What Khalidi alludes to is the way in which the Palestinians
themselves took charge of their narrative following the Nakba.
This self-narrative grew from the cultural arena into the political
one. In a strange way, the Palestinians collectively are an early
example of Spivak's observation, "we see the postcolonial migrant
become the norm thus occluding the native once again. 5 ' All
Palestinians have been turned into migrants. Even those who have
stayed in historical Palestine find themselves under the admin-
istration of Israel, Jordan and Egypt. For the refugees59 in other
countries beyond Palestine, they at least take a historical memory
56. See Motti Golani, Jerusalem's Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israel Policy on
the Jerusalem Question, 1948-1967, 31 INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 577-604 (1999).
57. RASHID KHADIDI, PALESTINIAN IDENTITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MODERN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 170-80 (1997).
58. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL
REASON: TOWARDS A HISTORY OF THE VANISHING PRESENT 256 (1999).
59. On the refugees, see BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN
REFUGEE PROBLEM 1947-49 (1987).
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that remains, but for those who remained in the actual place they
bear witness to the catastrophe. The Palestinians who remained in
Israel itself lived under military rules and saw hundreds of villages
destroyed.6° Worse, for decades this population was seen by much
of the Arab world as collaborators with the enemy, as they had not
left the land. From many physical spaces, the Palestinians become
the migrant self-narrators of their identity. Whereas as others in
the colonial/postcolonial space have to combat their represent-
ations and re-presentations (to follow Spivak's division of labor
between the political and the cultural), the Palestinians are in a
more problematic space where their identity appears erased. There
is perhaps one identity that was assigned to them from the United
Nations General Assembly and is that of "Palestinian Refugees"
(note the plural mimicking the plural of "non-Jewish communities"
in the League of Nations Mandate).61 It would take a further 26
years before the U.N. General Assembly on behalf of the inter-
national community brought itself to recognize the Palestinians as a
people with the right to self-determination.62
The representation of the Palestinians at all constitutes an
intrusion into the postcolonial. Whereas Ashrawi sees the narrative
as confiscated, the Israelis see the emergence of the Palestinian
identity as a violent challenge to their legitimacy, as a negation of
their identity. Israel and Jordan, between them, had effectively
removed the Palestinians from scene.63 It is all the more ironic that
the Israeli victory in the 1967 war, which re-united British
Mandatory Palestine, constituted the most decisive spatial advance
not just the project of a greater Israel, but also for Palestinian
nationalism. In a moment of military supremacy, Israel brought
itself head-on into an existential collision with its national Other,
the Palestinian national project. To the annoyance of the Israeli
leadership, and Golda Meir in particular, this forced them to
articulate the words Palestinian, as they denied their existence.
Despite its contradictions, .this was a strange triumph for the
Palestinian national movement in the moment of its greatest
defeats since 1948. Denial can become a comforting affirmation.
60. See NUR MASALHA, A LAND WITHOUT A PEOPLE: ISRAEL, TRANSFER AND
THE PALESTINIANS 1949-96 (1997).
61. See G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., (1974) December 11, 1948 and
the commentary on this in PAUL J.I.M. DE WAART, THE DYNAMICS OF SELF-
DETERMINATION IN PALESTINE: PROTECTION OF PEOPLES AS A HUMAN RIGHT
(1994).
62. G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Nov. 22, 1974.
63. See Avi SHAIM, THE POLITICS OF PARTITION: KING ABDULLAH, THE
ZIONIST AND PALESTINE, 1921-51 (1988).
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The physical building of Israeli settlements, therefore, takes
place in a new context for the Israeli national narrative. From 1917,
the Yishuv were weak in numbers and dependent to a large part on
British Imperialism. The direct struggle of land and immigration
has been conducted through a proxy political war with the British.
In 1947 and 1948, the diplomatic struggle in the United Nations and
the military struggle against the British and the Arab military forces
takes place against the disaster of the Shoah. The realization of
Israel takes place in the context of weakness, disaster and horror.
British and allied equanimity in the face of the Shoah let alone the
treatment of Jewish survivors became entwined with this
realization, as undoubtedly that guilt is displaced to Palestine. It is
against this background that the Israeli narrative takes on its heroic
nature of liberation; not so much a liberation from a colonial
regime as affirmation of survival against the Nazis. In the elision
between the Yishuv's struggle against the British and Palestinian
nationalism with resistance to Nazi genocide, a fateful politic is
welded. In this context, Nazism has to be seen as the last and most
destructive phase of 1000 years of European anti-Semitism. The
Western constructions of the East merge with the construction of
the Jew. Whereas the East is a disordered and backward space, the
Jews are disordered Other within. Palestinians and Israeli Jews are
thus condemned to a relational existence in both space and
representation. The claim for legal rights becomes encoded with
the narratives of this past. In the context new international
situation and the much-discussed coalition against terrorism, the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict assumes a highly ambiguous place in the
configuration of international relations. International law, far
remaining above the political fray, is deeply compromised in the
search for doctrine which can adequately square the circle of the
legitimate use of force by victims of injustice. Edward Said's work
offers us a way of interrogating the discourses of competing legal
narratives. Law's power lies not in its instrumental effectiveness
but in its ability to provide arguments for contesting parties.
Wisdom in law is the ability to construct the competing arguments
in a relational form. In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it remains an
urgent task.
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